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Abstract 
Ethnocentrism denotes a positive orientation towards those sharing the same ethnicity 
and a negative one towards others. Previous models demonstrated how ethnocentrism 
might evolve inter-generationally (vertically) when ethnicity and behavior is inherited. 
We model short-term intra-generational (horizontal) cultural adaptation where agents 
have a fixed ethnicity but have the ability to form and join fluid cultural groups and to 
change how they define their in-group based on both ethnic and cultural markers. We 
find that fluid cultural markers become the dominant way that agents identify their in-
group supporting positive interaction between ethnicities.  However, in some 
circumstances, discrimination evolves in terms of a combination of cultural and ethnic 
markers producing bouts of ethnocentrism. This suggests the hypothesis that in human 
societies, even in the absence of direct selection on ethnic marker based discrimination, 
selection on the use of fluid cultural markers can lead to marked changes in 
ethnocentrism within a generation. 
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Introduction 
Ethnocentrism, and more generally in-group bias, is a widely observed empirical 
phenomena in human societies. It has many aspects and occurs in various forms 
(LeVine and Campbell 1972). In many contexts people seem to divide the population 
into those who are considered as part of their group or their ‘type’ (what we will call the 
in-group) and the rest who are seen as outsiders (the out-group). Where such 
distinctions are made there is often a propensity for more positive behavior towards the 
in-group than towards the out-group. For example, it has been found that, under 
experimental conditions, even arbitrary group assignments produce in-group positive 
and out-group negative behavior (Tajfel et al 1971; Brewer 1979). 
In order to explore possible mechanisms that might produce such phenomena 
minimal simulation models have been presented in which evolutionary processes lead 
to ethnocentrism emerging over time (Hammond and Axelrod 2006; Jansson 2013)1. 
In these models, agents are located on a spatial grid and evolve inter-
generationally (i.e. vertically) with new agents being born, inheriting parent traits, and 
old agents dying. Both interaction and reproduction are localized in neighborhoods on 
the grid and agents cannot change their behavior or location during their lifetimes.  
Results from these models show that eventually agents come to favor their in-
group which is defined by an observable ethnic marker (or color). The ethnic marker 
evolves in the same way and at the same rate as behavioral traits through mutation and 
selection over generations. Hence, these models focus on long-term inter-generation 
vertical evolutionary dynamics  – no intra-generational learning can occur. 
We present a model with a different emphasis by considering short-run intra-
generational horizontal cultural dynamics related to a fixed ethnic marker and evolving 
fluid group identities that are not related to ethnicity. 
Our model produces results that contrast with the previous models, showing how 
purely horizontal adaptation can lead to the emergence of ethnocentric behavior. This 
results from the formation of subcultures that discriminate in terms of ethnicity in 
combination with fluid group identities. 
This article is structured as follows. Firstly, we describe an existing canonical 
simulation model of ethnocentrism and other relevant work. Then we present the 
motivation and assumptions of our model. We then describe our model in detail and 
present results obtained from a number simulation runs. We then interpret and discuss 
the results. We conclude with the implications of the model results in the context of 
wider research questions. 
Previous models 
Hammond and Axelrod model of ethnocentrism 
Hammond and Axelrod introduced a seminal artificial society, agent-based, simulation 
model of ethnocentrism (Hammond and Axelrod 2006). In their model, agents are 
represented with three traits: 1) a color; 2) an in-group strategy and 3) an out-group 
strategy. There are four different colors representing different ethnicities. Each strategy 
takes a binary value of either to cooperate or defect in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
game2. Hence, there are 4x2x2 = 16 different possible agent types. 
Agents are situated on a 50x50 grid3. Each grid location may contain a maximum 
of one agent or be empty. Initially the grid is empty but in each time period a new 
“immigrant” agent is placed in a random empty location on the grid. The traits of these 
new agents are generated randomly from the 16 different types possible. 
In each time period agents also play the pairwise single round Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game with their four neighbors (north, south, east and west) on the grid4. 
When a game is played, each agent compares its color to its partner. If they match, it 
plays the strategy specified by its in-group trait. If they do not match, then the out-group 
strategy is used. Hence agents that share a color consider themselves as an in-group. 
When an agent cooperates, it incurs a cost, but it receives a benefit when its partner 
cooperates. The benefit is three times greater than the cost. Over the time period, each 
agent accumulates the costs and benefits of their game interactions producing a final 
payoff value. 
At the end of a time period, agents may reproduce and / or die.  Reproduction 
involves making a copy of the reproducing agent into an empty neighboring grid location 
if one exists. Each trait of a reproduced agent is mutated with low probability5. The 
probability that an agent will reproduce is a function of its payoff. High payoffs mean an 
agent is more likely to reproduce6. Agents die with a fixed probability of 10%, this 
creates space on the grid allowing new agents to enter. 
An agent is defined as ethnocentric if it has a cooperative in-group strategy and 
an out-group defect strategy – that is, it donates to neighboring members of its in-group 
(those sharing the same color) and only these.  Results from simulation runs show high 
levels of ethnocentrism (of the order of 80%). This result holds over a range of 
parameter settings such as grid size, number of colors and mutation rate. However, it 
was subsequently found that the spatial localization of both reproduction and game 
interaction were necessary conditions for ethnocentrism to emerge7. 
Tag models 
A similar but more general treatment of in-group cooperation can be found in “tag” 
models. Here individual agents have a trait (or “tag”) that is visible to other agents, that 
is not hardwired to any particular kind of behavior or behavioral tendency (Geisel 1961; 
Holland 1993).  
The in-group in these models is defined as those that have close or matching 
tags (Riolo 1997, 2001; Hales 2000, 2010; Shutters and Hales 2013; Jansen and van 
Baalen 2006). Agents store a single tag8 that takes a value from a very large set (as 
opposed to a small set of colors) and a single strategy (either cooperate or defect). 
There is no separate in-group / out-group strategy but agent interactions are often 
biased (in terms of more likely to occur or more likely to be positive) towards the in-
group. The Hammond and Axelrod model is a specialized tag model with a small set of 
possible tags (colors), explicit in-group / out-group strategies and strict spatial 
interactions. 
Riolo et al (2001) introduced a tag model that allows agents to redefine their in-
group over contiguous ranges of tag values (represented as real numbers) where 
agents do not store a strategy but rather are hard-wired to cooperate with their in-group 
and defect on their out-group. Hence, they have no possibility to evolve different 
strategies for their in-group and are effectively forced to cooperate with others sharing 
exactly the same tag (Roberts and Sheratt 2002). Variants of this latter model have 
incorporated an evolving strategy such that agents can defect on their in-group 
(Edmonds 2006; Shutters and Hales 2013). 
Fu et al. (2012) apply evolutionary set theory to examine the conditions under 
which in-group and out-group cooperation can emerge where differential strategies can 
be applied to them. They find that a large number of groups are required with a high 
level of group migration (relative to strategy mutation) to support in-group cooperation. 
Axelrod, in his book on the evolution of cooperation, briefly discussed the effect 
that fixed labels (similar to the ethnic markers we use in our mode) could have on 
interactions between agents playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod 1980). He 
described how these could lead to poor cooperation between those not sharing the 
same marker. However, our scheme is not directly comparable to the work presented 
there9. 
Motivation and assumptions 
Some forms of ethnocentric behavior may be long standing, passed down from 
generation to generation, but this does not explain its sudden emergence within a 
generation. We are interested in short-term, within generation, emergence of 
ethnocentric behavior such as sudden upsurges of ethnocentrism within communities.  
In an intra-generational context, ethnic identity is relatively fixed but other cultural 
traits may be fluid. It is rare for ethnicity to change within a generation but common for 
other more fluid traits to do so (e.g. style of dress or opinions). 
In the models previously discussed each agent holds a single marker trait (either 
a color or a tag) that is not fixed but evolves along with other agent traits (such as 
strategies). Consequently these models cannot be interpreted as modeling the intra-
generational emergence of ethnocentrism because in this context the ethnic marker 
would be fixed. 
Also, in the previous models, agents are hardwired to view others with matching 
markers as members of their in-group. We are interested in the situation where in-group 
identification is itself a fluid and evolving trait such that agents have the ability to change 
their in-group definitions (possibly ignoring ethnicity completely). 
We ask the following question: Can discrimination based on fixed markers (which 
we interpret as ethnic group membership) evolve even when the markers themselves 
cannot evolve?  
In order to address this question we have created a model in which we endow 
agents with: 1) an intra-generationally fixed ethnic marker (similar to color in the 
Hammond and Axelrod model) that does not change; and three intra-generationally fluid 
traits: 2) a cultural identity (a cultural tag - similar to a tag in the previous tag models); 3) 
a definition of how an agent identifies its in-group based on ethnic marker and cultural 
tag; 4) a set of strategies for interacting with in-group and out-group individuals when 
they encounter them. Each of these traits is described in more detail in the Model 
section (below). 
By incorporating a fluid in-group definition we capture, in a minimal way, the 
notion that agents can form dynamic and composite in-group identities based on both 
fixed ethnic markers (which do not change) and fluid cultural tags (which do change). 
Hence the ethnic marker is fixed but the way agents define their in-group is not.  
In our model ethnic markers are stable classifications that others can observe. 
They might represent genetically determined and / or vertically transmitted cultural 
characteristics (ethnicity) but they could just as well represent any observable 
characteristic that is relatively stable during an agent lifetime (e.g. accent, gender, social 
class, nationality etc). The requirement is that they are stable relative to short-term 
horizontal intra-generational cultural change10.  Hence the functional aspect of ethnicity 
we model could relate to any piece of information that is visible to others but cannot be 
easily imitated or changed and therefore is intra-generationally stable.  
In our model cultural tags represent publically identifiable, imitable and mutable 
markers that can be evolved horizontally, intra-generationally, such as clothing style, 
publically expressed opinions, or other fluid group identifiers. 
The evolutionary process in our model is based on imitation and innovation 
occurring within the lifetime of the agents. Agents do not reproduce or die but inhabit a 
fixed size population. If an agent detects that another is doing better than they are (in 
terms of payoffs from a simple donation game) they imitate the other agent. Imitation 
involves copying all the fluid traits of the other: its cultural tag, in-group definition, and its 
in-group / out-group strategies but not the ethnic marker (which cannot be copied or 
changed). 
Whilst imitation is a complex process in human societies, we use this minimal 
method. Our assumption is that agents are not able to identify and copy the individual 
traits that lead to success but rather they emulate wholesale others who outperform 
themselves. This could result from cognitive limitations in complex social environments. 
Alternatively this assumption could represent social conformism. In human societies, 
such conformism can result from a desire to “fit in”, fear of sanctions, norms or other 
social monitoring processes. This is sometimes termed “social docility” (Simon 1990). 
This is a critical assumption in our model (and the others discussed) because if agents 
could intelligently and selectively copy specific traits purely for their own benefit then it 
would be unlikely that any cooperation would emerge. This approach implements a form 
of replication in an evolutionary process. 
Innovation involves agents spontaneously changing their fluid traits randomly. 
The assumption is that occasionally agents may change their behaviors for numerous 
reasons. These may include an error in imitation or some other contingent event 
resulting in a change of attitude. We do not model these processes directly but rather 
introduce random noise with low probability. This implements a form of “mutation” in an 
evolutionary process. 
We do not constrain interactions between agents by spatial proximity hence there 
is no space in our model. We do not model space because it has been shown that 
spatial interaction in itself favors the emergence of ethnocentrism but we are interested 
in interactions based purely on tag and marker processes (Jansson 2013)11. 
However, game interactions are constrained by in-group membership, with 
agents preferring to interact with their in-group. This is inspired by the notion that a 
densely populated locality or Internet community offers a wide choice of interaction 
opportunities but individuals prefer to interact with those within their in-group when trust 
is an issue12. We do not model the specific mechanisms by which agents perform this 
searching but such mechanisms could include social networks, institutional and social 
gathering places, clubs, meeting places and online forums etc. 
The assumptions that game interactions are constrained to the in-group but 
imitation is population wide are known to produce in-group cooperation from the 
previous models discussed. By adopting them in our model we expect to see high levels 
of in-group cooperation emerge. 
Model description 
Here we describe our model in detail – we term it the “ethno-cultural tag” (or ECT) 
model.  
Agents store traits that determine their behavior. They interact by playing 
donation games and through selective imitation which involves agents copying the traits 
of others. Agents spontaneously innovate by occasionally changing their traits 
randomly. This supports a minimal form of horizontal (within generation) cultural 
evolution where some traits spread and others disappear or spontaneously appear. 
Hence the behaviors of agents change over time but agents do not die or reproduce. 
Firstly, we describe the traits stored by each agent, then the events and 
parameters that regulate them. Finally, we describe sequencing of the events during a 
simulation run of the model. 
Agent traits 
The model consists of fixed size population of N agents. Each agent stores five traits: 1) 
an ethnic marker; 2) a cultural tag; 3) an in-group selector (which specifies the in-group 
definition used by the agent); 4) an in-group strategy and; 5) an out-group strategy. 
Table 1 summarizes the agent traits. In the following section, we describe each of these 
traits in more detail. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 trait type range 
ethnic marker positive integer [1..NE] 
cultural tag positive integer [1..N] 
in-group selector member of {none, cultural, ethnic, both} 
in-group strategy member of {donate, shirk} 
out-group strategy member of {donate, shirk} 
Table 1. Summary of agent traits. Each agent stores these five traits. NE and N are 
model parameters. The meaning of these is discussed in detail in the text. 
The ethnic marker and cultural tag 
The ethnic marker is a fixed observable marker pre-assigned to each agent. Agents 
assigned the same ethnic marker are said to share the same ethnic group. The fluid 
cultural tag is an observable marker indicating cultural group membership. Those who 
share the same cultural tag are said to share the same cultural group. Agents may 
change their fluid cultural tag based on the intra-generational horizontal evolutionary 
processes (see later) but their ethnic marker is pre-assigned and immutable. We allow 
for N possible unique cultural tags. This means that it is possible, maximally, for all 
agents to hold a distinct cultural tag or, conversely, for all agents to share the same 
cultural tag.  
The in-group selector 
Agents can only distinguish between other agents by observing their ethnic marker and 
cultural tag. That agents do not remember others as individuals is a simplification. In a 
sufficiently large population many interactions will not be with individuals one knows, yet 
one has to decide how to behave towards them. The in-group selector determines how 
an agent decides if others are part of their in-group based on the two (ethnic and 
cultural) observable traits.  
The in-group selector can take one of four possible types; thus, an agent defines 
its in-group as one of:  
1) those with the same ethnic marker as itself (ethnic);  
2) those with the same cultural tag as itself (cultural);  
3) those with the same ethnic maker and the same cultural tag (both); or  
4) any other agent without restriction (none)13. 
Agent strategies 
Agents store two strategies that are used during game interactions (see below). They 
store one for the in-group and one for the out-group. These are independent of each 
other and to their in-group selector. They can be either donators (co-operators) or 
‘shirkers’ (defectors) with respect to the in-group and separately with respect to the out-
group (as defined by the in-group selector). 
This means an agent can hold one of four possible strategy combinations:  
1) shirk against both the in-group and out-group (ss);  
2) donate to both the in-group and out-group (dd);  
3) donate to in-group, shirk on out-group (ds); or 
4) shirk on in-group, donate to out-group (sd). 
Initialization 
At the start of each simulation run all the fluid agent traits (the in-group selector, the 
cultural tag and the in-group and out-group strategies) are initialized to random values 
from their range (shown in Table 1)14. Fixed ethnic markers are initialized such that the 
population of N agents is equally divided between the number of ethnicities (NE). Hence 
if NE = 2, this means that 50% of agents share one ethnic marker and 50% share the 
other. 
Model events and parameters 
Interaction - a donation game 
Agents interact, in pairs, by playing a “donation game” in which one initiating agent must 
decide if to provide help (a donation) to the other partner agent. If the initiator decides to 
donate it incurs a cost (C) to itself while the receiving partner agent gains a benefit (B). 
We consider the situation where B > C, hence the benefit-to-cost ratio B/C > 1. If B/C = 
2 then this means the benefit is twice the cost. 
Thus a receiving agent benefits more from the action of the donor than the cost 
incurred by the donor. For example, this could occur if the donor had a surplus of some 
good which is of little value to themselves but of great value to a receiving agent. 
Alternatively, an agent could up-vote or otherwise positively comment on content 
provided by another in an online forum.  
During a donation game the initiating agent uses its in-group selector to decide if 
its partner is an in-group or an out-group member. It then enacts the behavior (or 
strategy) indicated by its in-group strategy or out-group strategy respectively. Each 
strategy takes one of two types, either “donate” or “shirk” (meaning don’t make a 
donation). Only the initiating agent selects a strategy and plays the game. The partner 
agent is passive either receiving a donation or not15.  
Over time different pairs of agents play the donation game and accumulate a 
total payoff based on benefits received minus costs incurred. 
Imitation 
Periodically an agent compares its payoff to another partner agent in the population. If 
the other agent has a higher payoff then all of their traits, excluding the ethnic marker, 
are copied by the initiating agent (overwriting their existing traits). This scheme 
implements a heuristic in which agents copy those who are doing better (in terms of 
payoff) implementing a form of horizontal cultural reproduction. 
Innovation 
Periodically, with low probability, an agent changes each of its fluid traits: cultural tag, 
selector, in-group strategy and out-group strategy (independently) to a random value 
from their range. This implements a form of cultural mutation. The mutation rate 
probability M is used for each fluid trait other than the cultural tag to which a larger rate, 
10M, is applied.  We inherit this assumption from previous models. It has been shown to 
be sufficient to produce cooperative groups without the need for strict spatial interaction 
and is explicit or implicit in most previous tag models16.  This implies that agents are 
more likely to change their observable cultural tag than their basic behaviors towards 
others. Another way to view the larger mutation rate applied to the cultural tag is that it 
is functionally equivalent to an agent holding several cultural tags with each 
independently mutating with probability M. 
Selecting partners 
For both game interaction and imitation events agents need a method to select a 
partner agent from the population. 
For game interaction, this involves an initiating agent randomly selecting a 
partner from its in-group (as defined by its in-group selector). If there are no other 
agents within its in-group then a partner is selected randomly from the entire population. 
For imitation events, a partner is randomly selected from the entire population – ignoring 
the in-group selector. Hence agents imitate over the entire population but game interact 
within their in-group. Note, results from experiments that relaxed this strict assumption 
are discussed in the “Further experiments” section. 
Table 2 summarizes the parameters of the model with the values used for the 
experiments that follow. Further experiments with different values are discussed in the 
“Further experiments” section and in the Appendix in Supplemental Material. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
  Parameter description Value 
N number of agents in population 1000 
NE number of ethnicities {1, 2} 
M mutation rate 0.001 
B/C benefit to cost ratio of donation 2 
Table 2. Summary of exogenous model parameters. Note: the specific values used for 
B and C were 0.2 and 0.1 respectively. 
Sequencing of events 
The simulation sequences events into cycles which represent some notional unit of 
time. Each cycle involves three phases: 1) game interaction; 2) imitation; and 3) 
innovation (in that order). 
In phase 1 (game interaction) each agent in the population is selected in a 
random order and initiates a game interaction. This involves it selecting a partner, 
based on the mechanism described above, and then playing a donation game with the 
selected partner (also described above). After a game interaction, the initiating agent 
and the partner’s payoffs are updated accordingly. 
In Phase 2 (imitation) each agent in the population is selected in a random order 
and initiates an imitation interaction. The initiating agent selects a partner randomly from 
the entire population.  If the partner has a higher payoff then all its traits are copied 
(other than the ethnic marker). Only the initiating agent decides whether to copy or not 
based on payoffs17. The partner agent is passive and does not perform any imitation 
action even if it has a lower payoff than the initiating agent18. 
In Phase 3 (innovation) involves each agent randomly changing its traits (other 
than the ethnic marker) based on the mutation (M) parameter: Independently the in-
group and out-group strategies are flipped (from donate to shirk or vice versa) with 
probability M. Also with probability M, the in-group selector is replaced by a random 
variant19. With probability 10M, the cultural tag is replaced by a randomly selected tag. 
A simulation run involves repeatedly executing phases 1, 2 and 3 for some 
number of cycles after which the run terminates. 
Further details on the implementation of the simulation model can be found in the 
Appendix in Supplemental Material. 
Simulation results 
Method 
A number of simulation runs (experiments) were performed with different parameter 
settings and the following measures were collected: the donation rate (dr) which 
indicates the proportion of all game interactions that led to a donation occurring; the 
inter-ethnic donation rate (ie) which indicates the proportion of the donations made that 
involved agents with different ethnic markers; the inter-cultural donation rate (ic) which 
indicates the proportion of the donations made that involved agents with different 
cultural tags; the proportion of each of the four in-group / out-group strategy types in the 
population: ss, sd, ds, dd; and the proportions of the four different in-group selector 
types in the population: none (sn), cultural (sc), ethnic (se), both (sb). These measures 
are summarized in Table 3. 
Each simulation run was executed for 3,000 cycles. For each run statistics were 
based on averages over the last 1000 cycles. Each run was replicated 20 times with 
different initial pseudo-random number seeds. Averages and standard deviations of the 
‘1000-cycle averages’ were then calculated over these 20 runs. Hence the standard 
deviations are over these 20 data points not the within run variation. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  Measure description Range 
dr overall donation rate as proportion of all games played [0..1] 
ie inter-ethnic donation rate as proportion of donations made [0..1] 
ic inter-cultural donation rate as proportion of donations made [0..1] 
ss proportion of agents with in-group and out-group shirk [0..1] 
sd proportion of agents with in-group shirk and out-group donate [0..1] 
ds proportion of agents with in-group donate and out-group shirk [0..1] 
dd proportion of agents with in-group donate and out-group donate [0..1] 
sn proportion of agents with the in-group selector type “none” [0..1] 
sc proportion of agents with the in-group selector type “cultural” [0..1] 
se proportion of agents with the in-group selector type “ethnic” [0..1] 
sb proportion of agents with the in-group selector type “both” [0..1] 
Table 3. Summary of measures collected from simulation runs. 
 
Results 
Populations with a single ethnic marker 
Firstly we consider the results obtained with only one ethnicity in the population 
(NE=1). In this case agents cannot, in practice, discriminate based on ethnic markers 
since all agents share the same marker – the population is ethnically homogeneous. 
This case serves as a baseline indicating the results obtained when no distinctive ethnic 
markers exist. Hence these results are presented in order to better understand the 
results obtained when more than one ethnicity is introduced in the subsequent 
experiments.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Results for NE=1 are shown in the first row of Table 4. Notice that the donation rate is 
high (dr > 0.9). The inter-ethnic donation rate (ie) is zero because all donations must, by 
definition, be between agents of the same ethnicity. The inter-cultural donation rate (ic), 
not shown in Table 4, was negligible ( < 0.01 with low variation) indicating that almost all 
donations were between agents sharing the same cultural tag. 
The dominant in-group selectors are cultural (sc) and both (sb) which are more-
or-less equally split and have high (and equal) standard deviations. The none (sn) and 
ethnic (se) selectors, not shown in Table 4, were negligible. 
The dominant strategy is in-group donation and out-group shirking (ds ≈ 0.9) 
while the unconditional donation and shirking (dd and ss) strategies have roughly equal 
low values around 6%.  The in-group shirking and out-group donation strategy (ds) was 
negligible and is not shown. 
Taken together these results indicate the predominance of agents who donate to 
their in-group defined as those with a matching cultural tag. 
The split between cultural (sc) and both (sb) selectors is not surprising because 
in this case (with only a single ethnicity) the sc an sb selectors produce exactly the 
same functional behavior. Both define the in-group as those with a matching cultural tag 
because ethnicities always match. Hence, there is no selective pressure between them 
resulting in a passive ‘drift’ between the two. The high and equal standard deviations of 
sc and sb indicate that each individual simulation run produces a variation of results 
with sc and sb being inversely proportional to each other.  
The high donation rate (dr) and in-group donation plus out-group shirking 
strategies (ds) are consistent with results obtained in previous evolutionary tag models 
(Riolo 1997, 2001; Hales 2000). In those models, high levels of cooperation (donation) 
were obtained when game interaction was based on tag similarity. This donation 
sustaining process results from a dynamic process of tag group formation (based on 
shared tag values) followed by their dissolution. This has been equated with a form of 
“group selection”20. An explanation of this process with a comparison of a number of 
similar models is given in Hales (2010) hence we will not discuss this in detail here 
because this is not a novel result from our model. However, in order to indicate the kind 
of tag group dynamics involved we give a brief outline before we proceed to discussion 
of results for multiple ethnicities. 
Figure 1 shows a visualization of the emergence and dissolution of cultural tag 
groups taken from a time series of part of an individual simulation run. Notice that 
cultural tag groups (agents sharing a tag) form and dissolve over time. Groups undergo 
a ‘life-cycle’ of stages that might be called: seeding, growth, decay and death. Typically 
a new small cooperative group forms with a cultural tag that is otherwise unused (due to 
innovation). This usually comprises two agents with strategies and selectors such that 
they donate to each other.  
The agents in the group do well in terms of payoffs because each donates to the 
other. Other agents imitate them creating more donating group members. Consequently 
the group grows. When the group is large, shirkers eventually appear by innovation of 
strategy – these decrease the payoff to other agents in the group since the shirkers 
exploit them. However, the shirkers temporarily do better than the donators in that 
group, since they gain donations but do not give donations.  This means others imitate 
the shirkers (becoming shirkers themselves), leading to a decline in the advantage of 
being in that group. Eventually by imitation agents move to other groups and the cultural 
tag disappears from the population.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
So long as new groups are created more quickly than they are dissolved, by 
shirking members, then high levels of donation can be maintained through this on-going 
dynamic process. In our model this condition is met by the assumption that the cultural 
tag mutation rate is higher (10M) than the strategy and selector mutation rate (M) 
 
.
 NE dr ie sc sb ss ds dd 
1 0.923 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.548 
(0.227) 
 
0.448 
(0.277) 
0.056 
(0.003) 
0.880 
(0.014) 
0.060 
(0.014) 
2 0.917 
(0.009) 
0.402 
(0.111) 
0.798 
(0.222) 
0.198 
(0.222) 
0.060 
(0.007) 
0.872 
(0.017) 
0.064 
(0.015) 
Table 4. Results obtained, in terms of measures listed in Table 3, for one and two 
ethnicities (NE) averaged over 20 independent runs. Standard deviations are shown in 
brackets. Note the values obtained for ic, sn, se, and sd were all negligible (< 0.01 with 
low variation) and are not shown. 
  
Figure 1. Time series of cultural tag groups for a portion of a single run. Simulation time 
is shown on the x-axis and cultural tags on the y-axis. A dot is plotted if at least one 
agent holds the given tag at the given time. Hence a long line indicates a cultural group 
lasting some continuous time period whereas a single dot or short line represents a 
short-lived transient group. Only the first 80 tags are shown over the last 150 cycles, 
however the dynamics are typical over the entire space of the run. This run is for NE=2. 
Populations with two ethnic markers 
As can be seen in Table 4, the experimental results for populations with two ethnicities 
(NE=2) show a similar donation rate (dr) and distribution of strategies as the single 
ethnicity case (NE=1). Hence introducing ethnic diversity into the population does not 
effect these. However, the distribution of in-group selectors is different. The cultural 
selector was more dominant at approximately 80% (sc ≈ 0.8) and the both selector was 
consequently lower at approximately 20% (sb ≈ 0.2). Again notice (as before in the 
single ethnicity case) the high and equal standard deviations for the cultural (sc) and 
both (sb) selectors indicating significant differences between individual simulation runs 
where sc and sb are inversely related. 
It is important to note that with two ethnicities the cultural and both selectors have 
different functionalities - which was not the case in the single ethnicity case. Specifically, 
the both selector defines the in-group based on ethnic marker and cultural tag. Hence 
an agent using a both selector excludes those who do not share its ethnic marker (in 
this case half the population) from its in-group. This precludes inter-ethnic donation 
when combined with the ds strategy (i.e. donate to in-group, shirk on out-group). 
Table 4 shows the average inter-ethnic donation rate (ie) as a proportion of all 
donations made. Since the population is equally split between two ethnicities we would 
expect ie ≈ 0.5 if no discrimination based on ethnic marker was occurring.  Given ie ≈ 
0.4 this means that the number of inter-ethnic donations are approximately 20% less 
than would be expected if no discrimination on ethnic marker was occurring. Hence we 
see an inversely proportional relationship between ie and sb where sb equates to the 
proportionate reduction in ie over the expected value. This is because almost all agents 
holding a both selector also hold a ds strategy and hence will not donate to others with 
a different ethnicity 
Macro dynamics 
Figure 2 shows example time series for simulation runs with two ethnicities. Notice that 
the cultural and both selectors do not persist in some fixed proportion over time but 
rather compete and vary over time. When the both selector is high then inter-ethnic 
donation (ie) and cultural sector (sc) is low. In general, ie is inversely proportion to sb 
and proportional to sc. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Figure 2. Time series of four independent simulation runs with two ethnicities (NE=2). 
Shown measures are: donation rate (dr), inter-ethnic donation rate (ie), cultural (sc) and 
both (sb) selectors. (a) shows domination of the population by the cultural selector after 
initial domination by the both selector. (b) shows an oscillation between the two. Notice 
that when sb is high ie is low. (c) shows a more typical run in which sc dominates. (d) 
shows a run where sb comes to dominate. 
Micro dynamics 
The macro dynamics in Figure 2 are the aggregate of the group micro dynamics shown 
in Figure 1. To understand the relation between them we examine the micro dynamics 
of the cultural tag groups. We found that almost all tag groups of size > 5 comprised 
agents holding the ds strategy combined with either the both or the cultural selector for 
the majority of their existence.  It is very rare that these selectors are mixed within a 
group. 
This can be understood by examining the group formation process. New groups 
are formed through mutation on the cultural tag moving an agent to a currently empty 
tag value. This produces a group of size one (a one-seed). A one-seed with either a 
cultural or both selector has no in-group members. This results in a game interaction 
with a random partner from the entire population and hence the enactment of the out-
group strategy. Hence an out-group shirk strategy combined with either of these 
selectors maximizes agent payoff because it will not make a donation. Minimally it will 
receive a payoff of zero but could receive more if it happens to receive a donation from 
another agent. 
A one-seed grows if it can recruit other agents through imitation. This will happen 
if another agent chooses the one-seed for imitation and has a lower payoff. In which 
case the agent will join the group by copying the one-seed tag, strategy and selector.  
At this stage a group will only produce positive payoffs for its members if its members 
donate to the in-group. Given each group is in competition with many other such groups 
those with in-group donate are more likely to imitated. This two stage selection process 
inhibits a one-seed from growing unless it is either a cultural or both selector combined 
with the ds strategy.  
But groups do not grow indefinitely, rather they have finite lifespan during which 
they grow, reach a maximum size, decline and finally die leaving the tag empty for a 
new seed to potentially enter and start the process again. This occurs because strategy 
mutation will eventually produce a mutant that holds a shirk in-group strategy thus 
exploiting the in-group by not making donations but still receiving them. The mutant thus 
receiving a high payoff will recruit others through imitation that will also exploit the in-
group. Exploited agents will receive the lowest payoff (of -C) and hence are likely to 
leave the group through imitation of higher scoring agents in other groups. Eventually 
the group will contain only in-group shirkers and produce zero payoffs for all. This 
explains the ss value shown in Table 4. 
Another form of mutation that sometimes invades part of a group is the out-group 
donation strategy (dd). This happens because it is functionally equivalent to the ds 
strategy for groups that have gone beyond the early-stage since they do not engage in 
out-group interactions. This explains the dd value shown in Table 4.  
Figure 3 shows two small example groups taken from a run to illustrate this life 
cycle.  
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Figure 3. Time series (stacked columns) of two example cultural tag groups from a 
simulation run with two ethnicities. (a) shows a group composed entirely of cultural 
selectors and (b) a group of both selectors. The two darker shades indicate ethnicity 
one (e1) and the two lighter shades ethnicity two (e2). The lighter shades within each 
ethnicity indicate the in-group shirk strategy (ss), the darker the in-group donate (ds) 
strategy. Notice the groups start with a single agent “one-seed”, grow, become invaded 
by in-group shirking mutations and then decline and die.  
We have seen that almost all groups comprise cultural or both selectors combined with 
the ds strategy initially. But what causes the both selector to be less successful than the 
cultural selector when there is more than one ethnicity? One way to understand this is 
to consider the early stage evolution of groups. 
Some early stage game interaction possibilities are shown in Figure 4. Notice 
that in the case of mixed ethnicity groups donations are constrained or reduced. 
Comparing Figures 4b and 4f notice that in the latter case no donations occur because 
the agents are of different ethnicity. Hence both selector groups are less likely to grown. 
Yet in many cases both selector groups do succeed. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Recall that in the baseline runs (comprising only one ethnicity) the cultural and both 
selectors are equally successful because they are functionally equivalent. Similarly they 
are functionally equivalent within an ethnically homogenous tag group. But there is no 
mechanism for sorting ethnicities between tag groups so groups that grow always 
become ethnically well mixed. But in the early stage of a group when it is of small size 
there is a reasonable probability that it will be ethnically homogenous by chance. An 
ethnically homogenous both selector group can compete equally (producing the same 
number of donations) as a cultural selector group. This can be considered as a form of 
noise that inhibits donation because ethnicities are effectively randomly distributed 
between groups. 
Once a group has at least two of each ethnicity a both selector will produce the 
same number of donations as a cultural selector since each agent can find an in-group 
member of the same ethnicity to donate to. Notice that the both selector group in Figure 
3b is ethnically homogenous for the first 4 cycles and in cycle 5 is equally split between 
both ethnicities. 
  
Figure 4. Some possible game interactions between agents within small (early stage) 
tag groups. Circles represent agents and indicate payoffs, arrows donations,  shading 
represents ethnicity. (a)-(e) show ethnically homogenous groups and (f)-(i) show mixed 
groups. Mixed groups constrain interactions when combined with a both selector 
(shown). For cultural selector groups interactions are not constrained since ethnicity is 
ignored. 
 
Given the early stage interaction possibilities it is evident that both selector groups are 
more likely to be successful (and grow) if they are ethnically homogenous at the early 
stage. This can be seen in Figure 5, comparing the ethnic homogeneity of cultural and 
both groups during their early stages. This clearly illustrates that successful both groups 
(in terms of reaching a size 10 or greater) are associated with higher levels of ethnic 
homogeneity than similarly successful cultural groups. 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Most tag groups never grow beyond small size. The majority of groups (≈80%) never 
grow beyond one-seeds and only ≈10% reach a size of at least 10 agents. However, the 
majority of game interactions occur within larger groups. This can be seen from the 
distribution of group sizes and associated areas shown in Figure 6. 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
The area of a group measures the sum of all sizes of a group over its entire existence. 
Hence a one-seed that existed for only one cycle would have area = 1. A group that 
lasted three cycles starting as a one-seed, then size 2 and finally size 3 would have 
area = 6. Thus the areas of the groups in Figure 3 are 249 and 363 respectively. Figure 
6 shows the cumulative total area for all groups reaching a given maximum group size 
(or above). Note that only about 10% of groups reach a size of 10 or more but almost all 
area (and hence game interactions) occur within such groups. Notice also that only 
about 0.3% of groups reach size 100 but they comprise 20% of the total area. The age 
of groups (not shown) follows a similar distribution with about 5% lasting > 50 cycles 
and only about 0.1% reaching > 250. No group gets beyond an age of 500 cycles. 
Large groups have the side effect of producing many new one-seeds through 
mutation on the tag - thus potentially reproducing a new copy of the group. Specifically 
a group will produce area * 10M new seeds over its lifetime because the tag mutation 
rate is 10M. For M = 0.001 this equates to area / 100 new seeds. Hence large groups 
can be viewed as engines of seed production spawning new copies of themselves. This 
leads to a positive feedback process that biases the production of new one-seeds 
towards currently successful selectors. In this context, although both selector groups 
are less likely to grow, if large groups do form and come to take over a significant 
proportion of the population then there is a lock-in process because cultural seed 
production is inhibited. 
 
  
Figure 5. Early stage ethnic homogeneity for groups reaching size ≥ 10 agents, shown 
for each stage of initial (rising edge) group size from 2 to 10. Notice that almost 70% of 
both selector groups were ethnically homogeneous for size = 2 (compared to an 
expected 50% from random mixing), indicating that early stage ethnic homogeneity is 
associated with the growth of both selector groups. Calculated over 3000 cycles for NE 
= 2 ethnicities.  
 
  
Figure 6.  Cumulative distribution of tag group sizes and their total area for a simulation 
run. Size indicates the maximum number of agents that a group reaches and area 
indicates the sum of the size of the group for each cycle of its existence. Calculated 
over 3000 cycles for NE = 2 ethnicities. Results comprise approx. 3x104 groups with a 
total area of 3x106. 
 
Further experiments 
We performed further experiments exploring parameters beyond the ranges given in 
Table 2. We summarize these briefly. For details see the Appendix in Supplemental 
Material (see also Hales and Edmonds 2015). 
Populations with more than two ethnic markers 
Populations equally split between four ethnicities (NE=4) produce sb ≈ 4% on average 
with low variance. Hence inter-ethnic donation (ie) is 4% lower than would be expected 
if no ethnic discrimination were occurring. This attenuated result arises because there is 
less chance of ethnically homogenous early stage groups forming and of groups 
growing to include at least two agents of each ethnicity. Similarly for NE=8 sb is further 
attenuated  (≈ 2%). Hence, the fewer effectively perceived ethnicities, the more likely 
are bursts of ethnocentrism. 
Different population sizes 
We ran experiments over a range of population sizes with two ethnicities. Small 
populations (N < 500) produced a high average sb (about 40%) with high variance 
between different runs − some runs produced sb values > 90% resulting in very low 
inter-ethnic donation rates (ie). This occurs because small populations allow for large 
both selector groups (if they form) to take over the majority of the population and thus 
“crowd out” the production of cultural selector seeds due to the positive feedback 
process discussed early. The same is also true for cultural selectors so large variances 
are observed between runs. 
With higher values of N the variance and average sb decreases converging to a 
value of sb ≈ 10% when N >> 1000. This means that for larger populations inter-ethnic 
donation is about 10% less than would be expected with no discrimination. This 
indicates that both selector groups can still form and reduce inter-ethnic donation but do 
not come to dominate the population. We tested populations up to N=12800 but do not 
have a proof that sb values would maintain this level as N→∞. 
Varying game and imitation partner selection 
Our model assumes game interactions occur strictly within the in-group whereas 
imitation population-wide. When we relaxed this assumption by replacing this  “all-or-
nothing” partner selection approach with probabilistic rules we found that similar results 
were produced so long as there was a significantly higher probability of in-group game 
interactions as compared to imitation interactions. 
Varying the benefit to cost ratio 
We experimented with different B/C ratios. We found that in general we get comparable 
results when the benefit is greater than the cost (i.e. when B/C > 1). 
Observations and interpretations 
Here we make some general observations based on the results. We then make some 
points concerning the interpretation of the model. 
Observations 
High donation rates occur between agents sharing the same cultural tag. This is 
consistent with previous evolutionary tag models of cooperation and is not a novel 
result. High donation rates occur due to the dynamic formation and dissolution of in-
group cooperative cultural tag groups with agents defining their in-groups with reference 
to these. The cooperation that emerges is due to generalized exchange occurring within 
groups (Takahashi 2000) and not due to direct reciprocation of donations (which is 
impossible here).  
Cultural tag groups trump ethnic groups and no pure ethnocentrism emerges. 
The majority of agents come to ignore the ethnic marker in defining their in-groups. In all 
cases considered agents do not come to define their in-group with reference to their 
ethnicity alone. Hence “pure” ethnocentrism does not emerge. 
A form of ethnocentrism does emerge based on in-groups defined by both the 
cultural tag and ethnic marker combined. In some circumstances this may dominate the 
population leading to periods of very low inter-ethnic donation rates, yet high overall 
donation rates. Such breakdowns in inter-ethnic donation are contingent and 
unpredictable yet reversible (as shown in Figure 2 above). Thus, for significant periods 
of time a population can evidence hardly any inter-ethnic donation activity. An observer 
in such an artificial society would occasionally see hard-to-explain rapid short-term 
transitions from high inter-ethnic donation to low and vice-versa. 
Ironically it is the success of the cultural tag processes that allows for the 
promotion of discrimination based on ethnic markers and cultural tags. This occurs 
when small early stage tag groups happen to be ethnically homogeneous through 
random variation in their composition. In this situation discrimination on both ethnic 
marker and tag is functionally equivalent to tag only discrimination. Such groups grow 
and soon become ethnically well mixed but still define their in-group with reference to 
both ethnic marker and tag. Within such groups donation only occurs between agents 
sharing the same ethnicity. 
Interestingly, we found that this process occurs mainly through short-lived groups 
of comparatively small size although a small number of longer lasting and larger groups 
serve to sustain the creation of those groups. However, overall we do not find any 
groups that last more than 500 simulation cycles. We also found that ethnocentrism 
attenuates with > 2 ethnicities, and with population sizes >> 1000, yet still persists. 
Interpretation 
The purpose of our model is that of theoretical exploration. It does not attempt to model 
the observed world in any direct sense but rather should be viewed as a thought 
experiment using an artificial society. It can suggest hypotheses about the observed 
world but does not, alone, prove anything about it21. 
The model assumes that within generation adaptation, based on imitation and 
innovation towards improving individual benefit, are the only processes that determine 
agent behavior change22. The purpose is to establish the sufficiency of these 
mechanisms for obtaining the described outcomes. Other mechanisms might well 
reinforce or frustrate the ones described here. Thus, the point of this model is to be able 
to separate out chosen mechanisms in a way not possible in observed cases in real 
societies. 
In our model all agent traits, apart from the ethnic markers, are fluid and may be 
easily changed. We ignore social networks, other relationships between agents and 
wider historical or cultural phenomena. Agents have no memory of past encounters and 
cannot recognize individuals. They can only distinguish others based on the ethnic 
marker and the cultural tag – nothing else. 
People in real societies do not change their beliefs and behaviors based on 
simple imitation or random changes. People are attached to particular beliefs and 
practices for many reasons other than individual benefit. In fact, beliefs and practices 
may be the basis of identity itself and be held even when they are of no benefit to the 
individual at all – perhaps even because they are of no benefit. Social behaviors and 
beliefs result from a complex interplay of upbringing, personal experience, social 
expectations and norms and are not purely the result of adaptation of strategy and the 
definition of who is the “in-group”. 
Also, real world groups often have specific barriers to entry (and exit) depending 
on their nature. One cannot immediately enter or exit them costlessly. Entry may involve 
vetting procedures, a trial period or some other cost. Exit may involve a penalty, loss of 
opportunity or other sanction. 
We view our model in a similar way to the famous segregation model of Schelling 
(1971).  This showed that even if agents had no intolerant predispositions their 
interactions produced high levels of spatial segregation based on fixed markers. Our 
model shows that even when agents have no specific in-group predispositions or 
discriminatory behaviors their interactions can lead to discrimination based, partially, on 
fixed markers. 
Yet the results from our model do not appear to relate to the traditional concept 
of ethnocentrism as widely used within the social sciences. Specifically our model 
produces ethnocentric behavior through short-lived, small, highly dynamic groups where 
there are only two distinguishable ethnicities rather than long-run entrenched group 
identities. 
Future work 
The model, although comparatively simple, evidences rich behavior that we have only 
explored one aspect of. Other future work could include:  
• Introducing migration such that new ethnic minority agents arrive at some fixed of 
variable rate; 
• Combining long-run generational vertical evolution (considered in previous models) 
with short-run cultural (horizontal) evolution considered in our model. 
Conclusions 
In our simulation experiments we found no cooperative groups based on the ethnic 
marker alone. Also, the amount of inter-cultural donation was insignificant in all variants 
explored. Anything that could be interpreted as pure ethnocentrism did not arise. 
Ethnocentrism, when it did arise occurred in conjunction with cultural discrimination. 
Unlike previous models (that follow Hammond and Axelrod 2006), our model showed 
how short-term horizontal cultural processes might explain the appearance of 
ethnocentrism, without a tendency for preferring one’s own ethnicity being ‘hardwired’ 
by biological, or other forms of, vertical evolution. 
Our model is consistent with the conclusions of (Yamagishi et al 1999), in that in-
group favoritism, in terms of distribution of resources, emerges from processes of 
generalized exchange rather than being linked directly to group identity. In our model, 
successful groups are where generalized exchange is working and hence attract new 
members via imitation. The agents in the model do not have expectations, but if they 
did, their experience might well have resulted in an expectation that in-group favoritism 
is a suitable strategy. 
The hypothesis suggested by this work, that ethnic-based discrimination may 
result from within-generation in-group formation, has a number of interesting 
implications. It would mean that ethnocentrism, when it occurs, may be the result of a 
short-term process that just happens to use ethnic markers as part of the in-group 
definition rather than being purely based on them23.  
This does not mean that genetic (or other forms of vertical) evolution has played 
no role, but that we might have evolved to flexibly determine what our in-group is during 
our lifetime. In our model, horizontal cultural evolution spreads in-group definitions and 
strategies that favor the in-group over the out-group. Empirical experiments have shown 
that people given arbitrary group assignments come to act favorably to the in-group and 
less so to the out-group (Brewer 1979). That work clearly demonstrates that no imitation 
or innovation phase is required. Simply telling individuals they are part of a group 
produces the in-group behavior. This implies that humans are predisposed to favor any 
in-group so long as they know how it is defined. It is sufficient for an experimenter to 
give them their group assignments. Hence, it appears that people are not a priori fixated 
on a particular in-group definition but that this is fluid. Perhaps, slower forms of vertical 
evolution (including genetic evolution) could select for in-group favoritism irrespective of 
the group definition - as might be suggested by the “Social Intelligence Hypothesis” of 
Kummer et al. (1997). In other words, genetic evolution might have adapted to the 
selective advantage of group cooperation by giving us this ability. Our general 
“groupishness” as a species (Ridley 1997) may have evolved in the past but not our 
salient groups in the present because they are culturally constructed and may change 
rapidly. In this context ethnocentrism might be viewed as merely one possible 
expression of inherent groupishness but not a long term evolved phenomena. 
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Notes 
1. Although it should be noted that Jansson questions the interpretation of the model as 
evidencing ethnocentrism by presenting a number of additional experiments 
indicating the role of space and kin selection as the dominant aspects of the 
Hammond and Axelrod model. 
2. A Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a canonical abstract game, generally played between 
two agents, that captures the notion of costly cooperation such that it is in an 
individual egotist’s interest to not cooperate (that is defect) but it is in the collective 
interests of agents to cooperate. To play the game agents select one of two 
strategies: cooperate or defect and then receive a payoff based on the strategies 
chosen. One way to think of this is that cooperation involves unconditionally giving 
help to the other agent whereas defection involves not giving help. 
3. The grid is wrapped to form a torus. In this way, all locations on the grid have a full 
set of neighbors because a torus has no edges. 
4. If a neighbor location is empty (does not contain another agent) then of course no 
game can be played for that neighbor location. 
5. The mutation rate is 0.005 (0.5%). Mutation involves replacing a trait with a randomly 
selected value from the range. 
6. The payoff is interpreted as a “probability to reproduce” (PTR). This is initially set to 
12% before agents play any games. The cost is a 1% reduction in PTR, the benefit is 
a 3% increase in PTR.  
7. A reference implementation of the model is included within the NetLogo programming 
language model library (Wilensky 2003). Also, experiences gained in replicating the 
model are discussed by Wilensky and Rand (2007). Jansson (2013) provides 
additional replications and analysis of modified forms of the model in order to 
question the validity of interpreting the model as capturing ethnocentrism. 
8. Although such models may contain multiple individual tag traits they are recognized 
as a unit or composite tag. That is, agents must share all the same tags to be 
considered part of an in-group. This effectively reduces to the functionally to a single 
integral tag but has the side-effect of increasing the effective mutation rate on the tag 
since mutation is applied to each individual tag that compose the composite tag. 
9. Axelrod’s discussion was related to the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (we consider a 
single round donation game) and did not consider the evolution of in-group definitions 
as we do here. 
10. See McElreath et al (2003) for a minimal (two group coordination based) model that 
supports stable ethnic marker formation in non-spatial scenarios (although possibility 
requiring previous spatial interactions). 
11. Jansson (2015) also explored in-group cooperation processes in non-spatial 
scenarios over a number of different two player games and found that, for a small 
number of groups, in-group cooperation is not preferentially selected in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game. We also explored spatial variations of our model and these give 
similar results to those presented (but with an increase in cooperation due to the 
spatial effects). 
12. One can speculate that such situations could occur where education, media or 
online systems bring together individuals from different cultural and ethnic groups 
(who can learn from each other) but utility producing interactions are often within self-
defined in-groups. 
13. Adding a fifth selector which has the effect that nobody is considered as being in the 
agent’s in-group made no significant difference to simulation outcomes. 
14. The same experiments were also performed in which agents were initialized to be 
purely ethnocentric (in-group selector = ethnic, in-group strategy = donate, out-group 
strategy = shirk). The results obtained were not significantly different from the 
random initialization case. 
15. This formulation is used by Riolo et al (2001). Such donation games are similar to 
the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) because it would always be in the individual 
interest of an agent (in terms of maximizing payoff) to shirk rather than donate. Yet it 
would be in the collective interest (or in-group interest) to donate. The one-sided 
nature of the game indicates an asynchronous game interaction structure rather than 
the traditional synchronous form of PD game. The PD is recovered with successive 
interactions between agents where each has a chance to donate or shirk. In terms of 
the usual notation for payoffs in PD models, T = benefit, R = benefit - cost, P = 0, and 
S = -cost. 
16. See Hales (2004) for a discussion of this assumption with reference to several 
previous tag models. Also see Fu et al (2012) for further analysis of this and the 
potential cultural processes that may underlie this. 
17. Similar results were obtained if both agents imitate. 
18. During this phase copied traits are only updated at the end of the phase. This 
means that during the phase an agent that has previously imitated from another 
agent can still be imitated by another agent but the traits passed on will be those that 
the agent started the phase with and not the new copied traits. Hence imitation 
updates are synchronous. This enforces the situation in which a payoff is associated 
with the traits that actually produced that payoff in the previous game interaction 
phase.  
19. Note that the innovation (mutation) phase is entirely decoupled from the imitation 
(reproduction) phase. Traditional evolutionary models often combine these two 
processes by only applying mutation to newly reproduced traits. This carries over 
from biological notions that innovation only occurs due to errors in copying. We 
purposefully avoid this assumption to capture the notion that agents spontaneously 
innovate irrespective of imitation events. Whether more traditional evolutionary 
algorithms might converge to the same results may be the subject of future work. 
20. Groups themselves are not selected but rather individuals are selected that create 
cooperative groups. It can be argued that such models do not evidence strict group 
selection but rather a form of kin selection. However, this is a controversial distinction 
which we will not rehearse here, see for example: Wilson and Sober (1994), Nowak 
et al (2010) and Smaldino (2014).  
21. The one exception is that it can provide counter examples to assumptions, showing 
how these could be mistaken. 
22. More formally, we concern ourselves only with so-called “horizontal transmission” of 
cultural traits (Boyd and Richerson 1985). 
23. Empirical laboratory experiments have shown that categorizations based on “race” 
were quickly discarded when other salient cultural group cues were presented to 
subjects (Kurzban 2001). 
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